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Abstract 
We estimate with Bayesian techniques the Italian dynamic General Equilibrium 
Model (IGEM), which has been developed at the Italian Treasury Department, Ministry 
of Economy and Finance, to assess the effects of alter-native policy interventions. We 
analyze and discuss the estimated effects of various shocks on the Italian economy. 
Compared to the calibrated version used for policy analysis, we find a lower wage 
rigidity and higher adjustment costs. The degree of prices and wages indexation to past 
inflation is much smaller than the indexation level assumed in the calibrated model. No 
substantial difference is found in the estimated monetary parameters. Estimated fiscal 
multipliers are slightly smaller than those obtained from the calibrated version of the 
model. 
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 1 Introduction
This paper estimates a linear stochastic version of the Italian dynamic General
EquilibriumModel (IGEM). The theoretical model has been developed at the Italian
Treasury Department, Ministry of Economy and Finance, to evaluate the e¤ects of
alternative policy interventions and scal consolidation packages in Italy. It was
originally formalized by Annicchiarico et al. (2013a). Instead, this paper focuses
on the models estimation.
The model developed by the Treasury has been designed to capture specic
features of the Italian economy. It formalizes a segmented labor market, where
di¤erent contract types coexist, and links limited asset market participation to
working contracts. Specically, IGEM formalizes a dual labor market where some
workers exhibit large union coverage, strong job insurance protection, and high
ring costs, while for others we nd minimal or no union membership, weak security
protection, and low ring costs. Weak labor contracts prevent some households from
participating in the asset market, and thus from sharing the risk associated with
labor income uctuations.
IGEM has been used to evaluate the macroeconomic impact of structural reforms
and policy interventions and to study the impact of scal devaluation policies on
the Italian economy. By calibrating the model, Annicchiarico et al. (2015) nd, for
instance, that scal devaluation policies are likely to produce slight improvements
in the external position of the economy only in the short-run, whereas output gains
appear to persist in the long-run. They also nd that taxation on consumption tends
to be regressive; therefore, the distributional e¤ects across households associated
with scal policies tends to be non-negligible.
The importance of the estimation of medium scale DSGE models and a clear de-
fense of DSGE estimation techniques against recent criticisms are provided, among
others, by Christiano et al. (2017).1 The evaluation of policy reforms and our un-
derstanding of the propagation mechanism of structural shocks need to be based on
estimated models; therefore, IGEM requires to be placed in a stochastic framework
and estimated.
1In general, after the remarkable progress in their specication and estimation, DSGE models
have proved their ability to t the data and their usefulness as policy tools. Smets and Wouters
(2003) and Adolfson et al. (2007), provide evidence that a New Keynesian model could track
and forecast time series better than a vector autoregression estimated with Bayesian techniques
(BVAR). Christiano et al. (2005, 2010) show that an optimization-based model with nominal and
real frictions could successfully explain the e¤ects of a monetary policy shock.
2
  
 
Our strategy to take IGEM to the data proceeds as follows. After incorporating
the stochastic structure in IGEM and linearizing it, we estimate the model on Italian
data by using Bayesian estimation techniques. To capture the unit root character of
macroeconomic time series, we allow a stochastic trend in total factor productivity
(TFP). Our estimated DSGE model has then been used to explore the impacts of
various shocks on the Italian economy.
We analyze the impulse responses of the main economic variables to structural
shocks and the uncertainty surrounding these e¤ects. The size of the shocks is, in
fact, determined by the posterior estimate of one standard deviation shock, i.e.,
we use the full joint posterior distribution of structural parameters and shocks to
produce the Bayesian uncertainty bounds of the IRFs. To study the e¤ectiveness
of stabilization policies, we also extend IGEM to incorporate active monetary and
scal policy rules in the original model.
Compared to the calibrated version of model, we nd: a lower wage rigidity
and higher adjustment costs; greater investment and labor adjustment costs; a
much smaller degree of prices and wages indexation to past ination; no substantial
di¤erence in the estimated monetary parameters, which are in line with the standard
literature results; slightly smaller estimated scal multipliers.
The conditional variance decomposition shows that total factor productivity is
the main driver of output variations and that it accounts for a signicant percentage
of the ination variability in the long run. Price mark-up shocks play a signicant
role in explaining price ination and output in the short run.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an
overview of IGEM.2 Section 3 presents our results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model overview
The core of IGEM is represented by the formalization of a segmented labor mar-
ket. There are four categories of workers: skilled and unskilled employees, atypical
workers, and self-employed workers. Workers of each category can be organized into
unions to bargain their wages. Households are grouped into two types. 1) Ricardian
households accumulate physical capital and (domestic and foreign) nancial assets.
Therefore, they can smooth their consumption. 2) Non-Ricardian households can
2The model is described in Appendix A in detail. All the estimated model equations are
reported in Appendix B. The equations are fully derived in Annicchiarico et al. (2013b).
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not trade in nancial markets or accumulate capital; they simply consume their
after-tax disposable income.3 The heterogeneity of the households is linked to the
labor market: Ricardian households supply labor services as employees (skilled and
unskilled) and self-employed, while Non-Ricardian consumers provide labor services
as atypical workers and unskilled employees.
Households can be either Ricardians or Non-Ricardians, i 2 fR;Ng. All of
them consume the nal non-tradable goods, Ct, and supply labor, Lt, receiving a
nominal wage for each kind of labor input j 2 ` according to the share supplied, sj,
to maximize:
E0
1X
t=0
t
"
Zt log
 
Cit   hCt 1

+
X
j2`
!j
1  vj s
i
j
 
1  Lij;t
1 vj# (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor. Preferences display the external
habit formation in consumption (h 2 [0; 1) is the habit coe¢ cient); Zt is a con-
sumption preference shock. The term sij denotes the share of household members
who are able to work in the j activity.
In the segmented labor market, the monopoly unions establish wages of skilled
and unskilled workers, who exhibit stable contracts and strong protection. There-
fore, employees are price makers; however, they face both price (nominal wages) and
quantity (hiring and ring) adjustment costs. Self-employed workers and profession-
als supply labor under contracts for services; therefore, they also have market power
due to the existence of professional orders or their limited number. Like skilled and
unskilled workers, they face price and quantity adjustment costs.
The market power of skilled, unskilled, and self-employed workers introduces a
wedge between the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution of consumption
for leisure. Atypical workers have no market power; in their case, there is no wedge.
These workers provide labor services taking the real wage as given. As price takers,
their wage is exible and they do not face adjustment costs.
Firms operate in four sectors that produce: tradable-intermediate goods, export
goods, import goods, and nal-consumption goods. Monopolistically competitive
rms produce single tradable di¤erentiated intermediate goods, Y , by using labor
3Among others, the relevance of liquidity constraints as an additional market imperfection has
been highlighted by Gali et al. (2007), Di Bartolomeo and Rossi (2007), Coenen and Straub
(2005), Forni et al. (2009), Di Bartolomeo et al. (2011), Albonico et al. (2017), and Ferrara and
Tirelli (2017).
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and physical capital as inputs in the following production function:
Yt = At
h
e
L
t NHLt
L 
e
L
t NSAt
N
(utKt)
1 L N
i1 G  
GKt
G (2)
where At denotes the total factor productivity,4 NHLt and N
SA
t denote CES aggre-
gates of labor inputs hired (NHLt is a combination of skilled and unskilled labor
inputs, Lt is a specic labor-intensity shock; ut denotes the capital utilization rate;
NSAt includes labor inputs from self-employed and atypical workers); and G
K
t is the
stock of government capital whose level depends on investment decisions on public
infrastructure. In changing labor inputs, rms are subject to convex adjustment
costs.
In the export (import) sector, monopolistically competitive rms transform do-
mestic (foreign) intermediate goods into exportable (importable) goods using a
linear technology. The nal goods are produced by combining a bundle of interme-
diate goods produced domestically with a bundle of imported intermediate goods
according to a CES technology. Non-tradable nal goods produced by the com-
petitive rms can be used for private and public consumption and for private and
public investment.
Several adjustment costs on nominal and real variables are modeled. These
variables are assumed to be quadratic in the deviations from the steady state values
and measured by a parameter  that captures their relevance.5
Specically, the model features two kinds of nominal frictions (convex costs
on price, measured by p, and wage adjustments, measured by 
W
` ). The price
adjustment equation is:
p
t (
t   1) = pEt
%it+1 (
t+1   1)
t+1Yt+1
Yt
+ 1  Y (1 MtMCt) (3)
where 
t = t=(
p
t 1
1 p
); %it+1 represents the appropriate growth rate of the
marginal utility of consumption/output; P measures price indexation; Y is a
measure of rmsmarket power; andMt denes a markup shock.
Similarly, adjustments of wage of kind i (which can be either skilled, unskilled
4It evolves according to an AR(1) process in logs.
5For instance, for a variable Xt, the adjustment cost is (Xt   X)2Xt=2.
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workers or self-employed) are described by
WS 
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where 
it = tWR
i
t=(WR
i
t 1
W
t 1
1 W
), WRi is the real wage and W measures
price indexation; WRT i is the post-tax real wage of workers of kind i and MRSi
is their marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption; i is the
elasticity of substitution between workers of kind i;Mit is a wage-markup shock for
skilled and unskilled workers.
In the model there are ve sources of real rigidities (investment, I , and labor
adjustment costs L` , variable capital utilization, external habit in consumption, and
imperfect competition in product and labor markets). Regarding the investment,
Ricardians own physical capital and control the rate of capital utilization. Physical
capital accumulates according to:
Kt+1 = (1  K)Kt + It; (5)
where K denotes the depreciation rate of physical capital. Investment decisions are
subject to a convex adjustment cost measured by exp(It )I , where 
I
t is a stochastic
disturbance.
A foreign sector and monetary and scal authorities adopting rule-based stabi-
lization policies are exogenously assumed.
The government issues nominal debt in the form of interest-bearing bonds. Pub-
lic consumption and investment, interest payments on outstanding public debt,
transfers to households and subsidies to rms are nanced by taxes on capital, la-
bor and consumption and/or by issuance of new bonds. To ensure that the scal
budget constraint is met, the scal authority is assumed to adopt a scal rule re-
sponding to public debt. Public consumption evolves according to AR(1) processes
in log deviations from its steady state. The tax dynamics are described by a scal
rule, which captures the tax response to the public nance indicators (debt and
decit) and the stance of stabilization policies.
The external monetary authority (ECB) controls the nominal interest rate (Rt),
which responds to some extent to domestic conditions. Specically, the monetary
authority adopts a Taylor-type interest rate rule, reacting to ination (t) and
output (Yt), augmented by past nominal interest rate (smoothing its e¤ects) and
6
  
 
nominal exchange rate (St) deviations from the long-run value. Formally, we model
monetary policy as
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
r t

 Yt
Y
y St
S
s1 r
eu
R
t (6)
where R is the equilibrium nominal interest rate,  is the monetary authority
ination target, Y is the steady state output, S is the long-run (steady state)
exchange rate; R; ; Y , S are policy parameters; and uRt is an AR(1) stochastic
disturbance, capturing the e¤ects of innovations in monetary policy.
The foreign sector is modeled as exogenous. The development of the net foreign
asset position depends on the current account surplus and thus on the decisions
of rms, households and government. The transmission mechanism from internal
to external variables is further complicated by the assumption that the domestic
exporting and importing rms have market power in the prices they set, such that
the net external position will depend on conditions in both nancial and goods
markets.6
3 Estimation
In this section we provide the estimation with Bayesian techniques of the linearized
version of IGEM. The priors are fully specied, and the estimates hinge on prior
assumption about the range of admissible values. Bayesian estimation relies on the
well-known Bayesrule:
p (jYT ) = p () p (YT j)
p (YT )
(7)
where p () is the prior assigned to parameter , p (YT j) is the likelihood and
p (jYT ) is the posterior density. Formally, the prior distribution and the likelihood
function are combined to obtain the posterior distribution; however, in complex
problems, this is typically not available in closed form and simulation strategies,
such as the Markov Chain Monte Carlo, are necessary. Here we have used the
well-known Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.7
The model is estimated using various macroeconomic data for the Italian econ-
6See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003).
7For a wider discussion on Bayesian methods applied to DSGE estimation, see An and
Schorfheide (2007) and Fernández-Villaverde (2010).
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omy. In particular, we use quarterly data ranging from 1992:1 - 2012:4. Nine
variables are used as observables: real GDP, real consumption, real investment, in-
ation, nominal interest rate, real wage and hours of skilled and unskilled workers.
The series describing wages and hours worked come from the INPS database, while
the other series are taken from EUROSTAT. The band-pass lter was used to de-
trend the series. To avoid stochastic singularity, we estimate a set of shocks equal
to the number of observable variables. The following shocks are considered: total
factor productivity ("TFPt ), public consumption ("
G
t ), monetary policy ("
R
t ), prefer-
ence ("zt ), investment specic ("
I
t ), price mark-up ("

t ), wage mark-up high-skilled
("wlht ), wage mark-up unskilled ("
wll
t ), and labor intensity ("
L
t ).
To avoid the correlation between observables and to improve the t of the model,
we allow for three measurement errors for the following observables: output gap,
high-skilled hours, and unskilled hours. All the shocks follow an AR(1) stationary
process, while the shock of monetary policy and measurement errors are based on
a white noise process. We have selected the subset of parameters to be estimated
based on the identication test proposed by Iskrev (2010). The subset of parameters
that we estimate is mainly composed of parameters that inuence the dynamics of
the model, such as adjustment costs and nominal rigidities.
Before estimating, we performed a global sensitivity analysis test to investi-
gate which regions of the prior support could potentially drive the indetermi-
nacy/instability of the model.8 From the test, we have obtained that all parameter
values in the specied intervals provide a unique saddle-path solution.
The remaining parameters of the model have been calibrated as in Annicchiarico
et al. (2013a). Specically, IGEM is calibrated on a quarterly basis to match steady-
state ratios and specic features of the Italian economy. With regard to the main
ratios, the private consumption share C=Y is 0:57, the investment share I=Y is
0:18, the public consumption share G=Y is 0:20.9
Table 1 reports the description of each estimated parameter.
8The test is implemented using the GSA toolbox in Dynare.
9See Appendix C for a brief discussion on IGEM calibration.
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Table 1 Estimated parameters description
Parameter Description
p Price adjustment cost
p Price indexation
WS Wage adjustment cost self-employed workers
WH Wage adjustment cost high-skilled workers
WL Wage adjustment cost unskilled workers
LS Labor adjustment cost self-employed workers
LH Labor adjustment cost high-skilled workers
LL Labor adjustment cost unskilled workers
LA Labor adjustment cost atypical workers
W Wage indexation
I Investment adjustment cost
r Taylor rule parameter, interest
 Taylor rule parameter, ination
y Taylor rule parameter, output
s Taylor rule parameter, exchange rate
uR AR(1) coe¢ cient monetary policy shock
Hw AR(1) coe¢ cient wage mark-up shock (high-skilled)
Lw AR(1) coe¢ cient wage mark-up shock (unskilled)
I AR(1) coe¢ cient investment specic shock
L AR(1) coe¢ cient labor intensity shock
G AR(1) coe¢ cient public spending shock
TFP AR(1) coe¢ cient TFP shock
Z AR(1) coe¢ cient preference shock
 AR(1) coe¢ cient price mark-up shock
Prior distributions are centered on a mean equal to the calibrated value in
IGEM for the correspondent parameter; we choose a Beta distribution for all the
parameters with support [0; 1], a Gamma distribution for the remaining parameters,
whereas an Inverse Gamma distribution is used for the variances of the shocks.
Posterior distributions are obtained by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm; the
procedure is implemented using the Matlab-based Dynare package. Mean and pos-
terior percentiles come from two chains of 50; 000 draws each from Metropolis-
9
  
 
Hastings algorithm, where we discarded the initial 30% draws.
Table 2 provides the result of our estimation for the parameters characterizing
the model, with the posterior mean and median estimates at the 90% credible
intervals.
Table 2 Prior and posterior distributions (model parameters)
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Density Mean S.D. Mean Median 10% 90%
r Beta 0.750 0.100 0.851 0.850 0.819 0.885
 Normal 1.500 0.250 1.376 1.306 1.133 1.634
y Normal 0.125 0.050 0.225 0.229 0.147 0.302
s Normal 0.010 0.005 0.012 0.012 0.006 0.019
WS Gamma 10 3 8.843 10.466 4.883 12.780
WH Gamma 71 15 32.552 45.305 17.355 47.583
WL Gamma 71 15 48.608 55.303 29.327 66.848
LS Gamma 15 5 0.880 0.630 0.553 1.224
LH Gamma 15 5 20.735 19.703 15.900 25.074
LL Gamma 15 5 49.640 45.550 37.958 60.542
LA Gamma 15 5 18.923 17.791 11.954 25.484
W Beta 0.500 0.150 0.106 0.084 0.036 0.175
p Gamma 330 50 309.400 314.202 235.582 387.795
p Beta 0.500 0.150 0.121 0.105 0.041 0.198
I Gamma 75 25.00 112.657 96.351 73.432 151.860
In Table 3, we report the estimated standard deviation of the shocks considered
and their autocorrelation parameters. For the standard deviations, we have elicited
an Inverse Gamma distribution with 2 degrees of freedom, while all the AR(1) follow
a Beta distribution. As in Table 2, we report posterior mean, posterior median and
the 90% credible interval.
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Table 3 Prior and posterior distributions (shocks, s.d., and AR(1) coe¢ cients)
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Density Mean S.D.10 Mean Median 10% 90%
"TFPt Inv. Gamma 0.01 2 0.010 0.001 0.008 0.012
"Gt Inv. Gamma 0.01 2 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.022
"Rt Inv. Gamma 0.01 2 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002
"zt Inv. Gamma 0.01 2 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.011
"t Inv. Gamma 0.01 2 2.041 2.045 1.457 2.587
"wlht Inv. Gamma 0.01 2 0.649 0.853 0.310 0.954
"wllt Inv. Gamma 0.01 2 1.271 1.410 0.719 1.816
"Lt Inv. Gamma 0.01 2 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.011
"It Inv. Gamma 0.01 2 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.005
G Beta 0.5 0.1 0.780 0.796 0.676 0.877
TFP Beta 0.5 0.1 0.953 0.953 0.935 0.971
Z Beta 0.5 0.1 0.625 0.622 0.481 0.776
I Beta 0.5 0.1 0.853 0.865 0.813 0.897
 Beta 0.5 0.1 0.119 0.108 0.022 0.205
Hw Beta 0.5 0.1 0.228 0.228 0.094 0.342
Lw Beta 0.5 0.1 0.214 0.210 0.075 0.352
L Beta 0.5 0.1 0.574 0.583 0.375 0.768
uR Beta 0.5 0.1 0.071 0.058 0.014 0.123
From the estimate, we observe a high degree of persistence for the interest rate,
which is in line with the literature. The costs of adjustment of prices and wages
indicate a considerable degree of nominal rigidity in the economy. As expected,
when considering shocks, the total factor productivity has a high degree of auto-
correlation, which indicates a high degree of inertia, while mark-up shocks appear
to be less persistent.
In the labor market, the estimated adjustment costs of prices (nominal wages)
and quantities (hiring and ring costs) are relevant for employees, especially for low
skilled workers, who su¤er high hiring and ring costs. Moderate price and quantity
adjustment costs are estimated for the self-employed; their hiring and ring costs
are lower than those of atypical workers.
The estimated wage rigidities are usually lower than their correspondent values
10For the Inverse Gamma distribution, the degrees of freedom are indicated.
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in the calibrated IGEM, while the opposite is true for the adjustment costs of
quantities. The same applies to the adjustment costs of investments. Finally, a
moderate indexation of prices and wages is observed (lower than the value assumed
in the IGEM calibration).
In the gures below, we represent the prior (gray line) and posterior (black line)
distribution of the estimated parameters. The green line indicates the mode. We
observe that, for all the parameters, the posterior shape is well formed and does
not overlap with the prior distribution, showing that all the estimated parameters
are correctly identied. In Appendix D, we provide further details to verify the
robustness of our estimates.
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Figure 1 - Prior and posterior distributions
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3.1 Impulse response analysis
This section presents a simulation of the e¤ects on the Italian economy of structural
shocks for a set of selected endogenous variables. We assess the IRFs to the struc-
tural shocks whose magnitude and autocorrelation originate from their posterior
estimated mean. Specically, we consider the dynamic mean response of output,
consumption, nominal interest rate, ination, investment, hours worked and real
wage for both high-skilled and unskilled to three structural shocks, total factor
productivity, public consumption, and monetary policy. The IRFs are depicted in
the next gures, where the black line is the mean IRF, and the gray-shaded areas
provide the highest posterior density intervals at 90% of condence.
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Figure 3 - Impulse response function to a TFP shock
In Figure 3, we show the dynamic response to a TFP shock. As expected,
an improvement in the total factor productivity has positive e¤ects on output,
consumption, and investment. The real wage also rises; however, there is a negative
employment e¤ect. Labor initially decreases and then progressively returns to its
steady state. Supply shocks lead to a demand externality due the presence of
nominal rigidities (Galí, 1999). Specically, after the positive shock in total factor
productivity, rms are able to produce more for a given level of input. In the early
periods after the shock, aggregate demand does not adjust immediately due to price
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stickiness; thus, rms reduce the number of hours worked.
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Figure 4 - Impulse response function to a public consumption shock
The IRFs to a positive shock in the government spending are plotted in Figure
4. Output and labor exhibit an initial increase, whereas higher public spending
crowds out private consumption and investment. Although there is a signicant
level of liquidity constrained consumers, a positive shock on public consumption
entails a fall in the aggregate level of consumption. The same result is found in
QUEST III (DAuria et al., 2009).
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Figure 5 - Impulse response function to a monetary policy shock
In Figure 5, we show the dynamics of the selected variables when a monetary
tightening is considered. The policy innovation leads to a rise in the nominal short-
term interest rate. As the monetary tightening involves a fall in ination, the real
interest rate increases more than the nominal one. For each one-percent increase in
ination, the central bank tends to raise the nominal interest rate by more than one
percentage point. A monetary tightening then involves a reduction in consumption
and investment and entails a decrease of the output. Hours worked decrease for
both high-skilled and unskilled workers.
Figure 5 does not imply a hump-shaped path for output after an innovation
in monetary policy, although this path is clearly observed for consumption. The
rationale lies in the open-economy nature of the model. In fact, the increase in the
interest rate on public debt, given the foreign one, stimulates a quick appreciation
in the domestic currency due to arbitrage. The resulting fall in competitiveness
leads to a strong increase in imports and a fall of exports. The initial worsening
of the current account (when the interest rate is higher) leads to a greater fall in
domestic production, which adds to the initial (moderate) fall in consumption, be-
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cause of its hump-shaped pattern. As the interest rate returns to its initial value,
the competitiveness also returns to its initial level, the e¤ect of trade balance be-
comes moderate; however, consumption continues to decline until its negative peak
is achieved. As consumption resumes and the negative current account disappears,
the fall in output shrinks. Thus, no hump-shape is observed for the output path
after a monetary shock.
Finally, we compute some short-run scal multipliers. As many papers empha-
size how temporary scal policies can have di¤erent e¤ects on output if monetary
policy remains accommodative for a prolonged period, we assess the impact of
various scal policies under alternative assumptions about the stance of monetary
policy (accommodative and non-accommodative policies).11 Fiscal multipliers ob-
tained from the estimated version of IGEM are compared to those stemming from
the calibrated version. The one-year scal multiplier on real GDP is between 0:885
and 1:469, depending on the stance of monetary policy. The corresponding multi-
plier for the calibrated version of the model instead oscillates between 1:069 and
1:941. The public investment multiplier is between 1:024 and 1:501 (estimated
IGEM) against 1:270 and 2:003 (calibrated IGEM). Finally, the one-year e¤ects of
a tax change on real GDP is between 0:397 and 0:805. In the calibrated version of
IGEM, it oscillates between 0:433 and 1:029.
3.2 Variance decomposition
We analyze the contribution of each of the structural shocks to the forecast error
variance of output and ination at various horizons. In particular, by t = 4 we
indicate the short run (1 year); t = 10 labels the medium run (2:5 years); and
t = 100 denotes the long run (25 years).
11Fiscal multipliers are computed by following Coenen et al. (2012).
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Table 4 Variance decomposition
Shock t = 4 t = 10 t = 100
Output Ination Output Ination Output Ination
TFP 18.26 15.43 47.51 16.44 67.04 17.13
Public spending 8.59 0.67 5.06 0.66 3.15 0.68
Monetary policy 31.89 6.80 20.48 6.88 12.77 7.14
Preference 1.63 0.26 1.19 0.26 0.74 0.27
Investment specic 1.16 0.02 0.65 0.02 0.40 0.02
Price mark-up 38.24 76.74 24.59 75.60 15.27 74.59
Wage mark-up (h.s.) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Wage mark-up (l.s.) 0.23 0.07 0.51 0.12 0.63 0.15
Labor intensity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
In the short run, changes in output are mainly determined by price mark-up,
monetary and TFP shocks; public spending shocks also play an important role in
explaining the variability of output. As the forecast horizon increases, the relative
importance of the price mark-up shocks decreases, and disturbances in total factor
productivity are able to roughly explain 3=4 of output variability. With regard to
ination, there are two main determining factors: price mark-up and technological
shocks. In the short run, the mark-up shock is the main driver of ination variabil-
ity. In the long run, the mark-up shock is still the main determinant of ination
volatility, but now the TFP shocks account for around 17% of its variation.
3.3 Historical decomposition
This section studies the historical contribution of each estimated shock to the output
and ination deviations from 2000 onwards (with particular attention to the recent
crisis). The decomposition is based on the best estimates of the various shocks.
Although historical decompositions should be treated with caution, they help in
understanding how the estimated models interpret specic changes (for instance,
recessions) in observed data.
The historical contribution of the various structural shocks to output and in-
ation are summarized in Figure 6 and 7. The black lines represent the deviation
of the smoothed value of the endogenous variables (output or ination) from their
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steady state. The colored bars correspond to the contribution of di¤erent shocks
to those deviations. The initial values in the graphs refer to the portion of the
steady state deviations that are explained by the unknown initial value of the state
variables and not by the smoothed shocks. The inuence of initial values usually
extinguishes relatively quickly.
Figure 6 - Historical decomposition of output
Figure 6 describes the output gap decomposition. We observe that the recession
in the early 1990s was mainly driven by adverse preference, risk premium and TFP
shocks. Conversely, the recent crisis was driven by negative preference and public
spending shocks. The former remained the main driver of the 2012 downturn.
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Figure 7 - Historical decomposition of ination
Examining the historical decomposition of ination (Figure 7), we nd that
price mark-up shock is strictly correlated with ination movements along the en-
tire sample. Inationary episodes are mainly induced by a mark-up increase, and
deationary periods are associated with negative mark-up shocks. Monetary policy
appears to have a negligible role in explaining the cyclical variation of ination in
the sample considered.
4 Conclusions
The small-open economy model of the Italian economy (IGEM)12 has been esti-
mated with Bayesian techniques. We considered ve macro-variables, namely GDP,
consumption, investment, ination, and nominal interest rate. Moreover, given the
models focus on the labor market, we also considered four additional variables mea-
suring real wage and hours worked for high- and low-skilled workers. A wide set of
well-identied parameters, concentrating on parameters a¤ecting the dynamics of
the model have been estimated.
Our empirical results can be summarized as follows.
1. Compared to the calibrated version of IGEM, estimated nominal wage sticki-
ness is smaller for all types of work; by contrast, adjustment costs (including
12Originally developed by Annicchiarico et al. (2013a).
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those for investments) are higher. The degree of prices and wages indexation
to past ination is much smaller than the indexation levels assumed in the
calibrated model. No substantial di¤erence is found in the estimated mone-
tary parameters. Estimated scal multipliers are slightly smaller than those
obtained from the calibrated model.
2. Closely examining the segmented labor market, the IGEM core, both nominal
wages and hiring/ring costs are relevant for employees particularly for those
who are low skilled. By contrast, the estimated price and quantity adjustment
costs are moderate for the self-employed. Finally, atypical workers are subject
to relevant hiring and ring costs.
3. The disturbances of total factor productivity exhibit a high degree of iner-
tia, whereas mark-up shocks appear to be signicantly less persistent. The
conditional variance decomposition shows that the total factor productivity is
the main driver of output changes. It also accounts for a signicant percent-
age of the ination variability in the long run. Price mark-up shocks play a
signicant role in explaining price ination and output mainly in the short
run.
Our analysis could be developed in several directions in future research. It would
be interesting to concentrate on the estimation of scal multipliers before and after
the crisis, also including some scal variables in our observable set to estimate scal
rules and to compare their stabilizing properties to simple optimal rules. In a future
study, more attention should be given to distinguishing revenue components due to
automatic stabilization from others by a detailed analysis of various tax rules.
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 Appendix A - The IGEM model
4.1 Households
Households consume the nal non-tradable goods supplied by perfectly competitive
rms, supply labor and rent out capital to rms. A continuum of households is
distributed over a segment of mass one; a proportion sN is Non-Ricardian (N),
the other groups of households is Ricardian (R). The representative Ricardian
and Non-Ricardian household preferences depend on consumption (Ci) and labor
supplied (Lij), which can be of four kinds: atypical (A), low- (L), high-skilled (H),
self-employed work (S), i.e. i 2 fN;Rg and j 2 ` := fA;L;H; Sg. In particular,
the following specication is assumed:
E0
1X
t=0
t
"
log

Cit   hiC
i
t 1

+
X
j2`
!j
1  vj s
i
j
 
1  Lij;t
1 vj# ; i 2 fR;Ng (8)
where E0 is the expectations operator conditional on information available at time 0,
and  2 (0; 1) represents the subjective discount factor; h, !, v are commonly used
preference parameters. Preferences display external habit formation in consumption
and h 2 [0; 1) is the habit coe¢ cient (Ct 1 the lagged aggregate consumption, taken
as given by each household).
The terms sij denote the share of householdsmembers able to work in the j
activity (
P
j2` s
i
j = 1). The shares of workers present in the labor market by their
type are then si = sNi sN + s
R
i (1  sN) for i 2 `.13
The households ow real budget constraint is:
(1 + Ct )PC;t
Pt
Cit + 
iPI
R
t + FI
R
t
Pt
=
X
j2`
sij
 
1   jt

W jt
Pt
Lij;t + Tr
i+
  T it  
X
j2`
sij
 Wj;t
Pt
Yt + 
R

PRORt +KSRt
PI;t
Pt
utK
R
t

; i 2 fR;Ng
where i is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 for Ricardians and zero, otherwise.
All kinds of households consume (Cit), receive a nominal wages for each kind
of labor input j (Lj;tWj;t=Pt), according to the share supplied, and transfers from
13Ricardians can be hired as atypical and low-skilled workers, while Non-Ricardians can be
hired as atypical and low-skilled workers; thus, sNS = s
N
H = s
R
A = 0. It follows that sA = s
N
S sN ,
sL = s
N
L sN + s
R
L (1  sN ), sH = sRH (1  sN ), sS = sRS (1  sN ).
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the government (Tri); they pay lump-sum taxes (T i), consumption taxes (at a
rate Ct ), and wage income taxes and contributions to social security (at rates 
j
t).
Households also face quadratic adjustment costs ( Wj;t)
14 for indexed nominal wage,
later dened in details.
The dichotomous variable i rules out from the constraint of Non-Ricardian
households the decisions regarding physical and nancial investments (PIR and
FIR) and their revenues, i.e. dividends (PROR), from the intermediate goods
rms, and (per unit) capital service net return (KSRt). Ricardian households are
in fact assumed to own three assets: government bonds, BR, paying a gross nominal
interest rate equal to R, foreign nancial assets, BRF , paying a gross rate equal to R

adjusted for a risk premium F (increasing in the aggregate level of foreign debt),
and physical capital KR.
Financial and physical investments are dened as FIRt = B
R
t   Rt 1BRt 1 +
St

BRF;t   (Rt 1 + Ft 1)BRF;t 1

and PIRt = PI;t

IRt +
 
 It +  
u
t

KRt

, where St is
the nominal exchange rate dened as units of domestic currency per unit of for-
eign currency; PI the price of a unit of the investment good (IRt );  
I and  u are
investment and capital utilization convex adjustment costs (dened below).
Physical capital accumulates according to:
KRt+1 = (1  K)KRt + IRt ; (9)
where K denotes the depreciation rate of physical capital. Investment decisions
are subject to a convex adjustment cost of  ItK
R
t units of the nal good (with
 It =
1
2
I
I
t

IRt
KRt
  K
2
and I > 0). Owners of physical capital are also assumed
to control the rate of utilization at which this factor is utilized, ut. Using the stock
of capital at a rate ut entails a cost in terms of the nal good equal to  utK
R
t (with
 ut = u1 (ut   1) + 12u2 (ut   1)2, u1 ; u2 > 0). Ricardians earn a capital service
net return KSRt = (1  Kt )rKt + Kt K , where K are capital income taxes.
By maximizing (8) subject to the ow real budget constraint, we obtain con-
sumption for both kinds of households. Moreover, considering the additional con-
straint (9), we also nd the Ricardian demands for assets. Regarding labor supply,
we must distinguish the di¤erent labor input types since labor markets feature
di¤erent institutional details.
Specically, self-employed workers, skilled and unskilled employees operate in
14Atypical workers do not face adjustment cost as they are assumed to be price takers.
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a monopoly competitive market. Thus, here representative professional orders or
trade unions set the nominal wages, subject to quadratic wage adjustment costs.
Specically, in each of the three segments of the non-competitive labor market
i 2 fLL; LH ; NSg operate a continuum of symmetric price makers; the elasticities of
substitution between labor inputs (i > 0) determine wage settersmarket powers.
In market i, the wage setter j sets W it (j) to maximize householdsexpected utility
(8), given the demand for its di¤erentiated labor services (determined by i) and
subject to a convex adjustment costs function:  Wi;t =
Wi
2

W it (j)=W
i
t 1(j)

W
t 1
1 W   1
2
Yt for
i 2 `, where Wi > 0 and Wt 1
1 W is a geometric average of past gross (Wt 1)
and long-run ination (W ), where the weight of past ination is determined by
the indexation parameter W 2 [0; 1].
As the atypical sector is a competitive market, workers are price takers (there is
no union coverage and non-wage adjustment cost, i.e. WA = 0). The labor supply
equation is then simply obtained by solving the optimization problem of the typical
Non-Ricardian household (equating the real wage, WAt =Pt, to the marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and consumption). Remember that, by assumption,
only Non-Ricardian households supply labor services.
4.2 Firms
On the supply side, the economy presents four sectors: i) tradable intermediate
good sector; ii) export sector; iii) import sector; iv) nal good sector.
In the tradable sector, a continuum of monopolistically competitive rms in-
dexed by j 2 [0; 1] produces single tradable di¤erentiated intermediate goods by
using labor and physical capital as factor inputs. The typical rm j uses labor
inputs and capital to produce intermediate goods Yt(j) according to the following
technology:
Yt(j) = At

NHLt (j)
LNSAt (j)
N (utKt(j))
1 L N 1 G  GKt G ; (10)
where At denotes the total factor productivity, NHLt and N
SA
t denote CES aggre-
gates of labor inputs hired; other symbols are strictly positive production parame-
ters (with G < 1, L + N < 1). NHLt represents a combination of skilled and
unskilled labor inputs hired in less competitive markets, while NSAt includes labor
inputs hired in the form of more exible labor patterns. GKt is the stock of govern-
24
  
 
ment capital whose level depends on the public infrastructure investment decisions
IGt and evolves as G
K
t = (1  G)GKt 1 + IGt . The labor aggregates are dened as:
NHLt =
X
i2fH;Lg
eiN
HL 1
HL
i;t
 HL
HL 1
and NSAt =
X
i2fS;Ag
eiN
SA 1
SA
i;t
 SA
SA 1
.15 La-
bor inputs NL;t, NH;t, NS;t, are, in turn, CES bundles of di¤erentiated labor inputs
with elasticity of substitution equal to L, H and S, respectively.
Given the production function, the objective of each rm j is to maximize the
sum of expected discounted real prots by setting the optimal price Pt(j) and
making choices about labor inputs and physical capital, given the available tech-
nology (10), the standard demand schedule for variety j, Yt(j) = (Pt(j)=Pt)
 Y Yt,
quadratic adjustment costs on price setting and on labor inputs changes. Quadratic
adjustment costs on price setting are  Pt =
P
2

Pt(j)=Pt 1(j)

P
t 1
1 P   1
2
Yt, with P > 0
and P 2 [0; 1] denoting weight of past ination in the indexation. Quadratic ad-
justment costs on the four labor inputs changes are:16  Li =
Li
2

Ni;t(j)
Ni;t 1(j)
  1
2
Yt
for i 2 `, where Wi > 0. Firms are also assumed to pay social contributions at
rates Hf , 
L
f , 
A
f and 
S
f , respectively for skilled and unskilled employees, atypical
workers and self-employed workers, and may receive incentives in the form of sub-
sidies for hiring workers (with the exception of self-employed) at the di¤erentiated
rates subH , subL, and subA.
In the export sector, a continuum of monopolistically-competitive-exporting
rms transforms domestic intermediate goods into exportable goods using a lin-
ear technology. Exporters set the price for their product at a markup over their
marginal cost. The price set by the exporter in foreign currency for the good
j, PX;t(j), maximizes the expected discounted value of future prots, taking as
given the exchange rate St and the world demand for good j, i.e., EXPt(j) =
(PX;t(j)=PX;t)
 EXP EXPt, where EXP > 1 is the elasticity of substitution be-
tween tradable goods, EXPt denotes the total demand of exportations, and PX;t =hR 1
0
PX;t (j)
1 EXP dj
i 1
1 EXP is the export price index. Exporting rms are subject
to adjustment costs:  PXt =
EXP
2

PX;t(j)=PX;t 1(j)

EXP
t 1 
1 EXP   1
2
EXPt, which are mea-
sured by EXP > 0; 
EXP
t 1 
1 EXP is a geometric average of past (gross) and
15We have dropped index j to save on notation. Note that coe¢ cients (ei) can be disentangled
to capture di¤erent e¤ects of shock in the production functions. See Annicchiarico et al. (2013a).
16It is assumed that 0 < NA < NS < LH = LL in order to capture the higher costs associated
with changes in the labor inputs related to workers with stable contracts.
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long-run ination prevailing in the foreign market (the weight of past ination is
determined by the indexation parameter EXP 2 [0; 1]).
Similarly, in the competitive import sector, a continuum of monopolistically-
competitive-importing rms transforms foreign intermediate goods into importable
goods using a linear technology. Importers set prices in local currency as a markup
over the import price of intermediate goods produced abroad and facing a demand
IMPt(j) =
 
PM;t(j)=P
M
t
 IMP IMPt where IMP > 1 is the elasticity of substitu-
tion between imported goods, IMPt denotes the total demand of imported goods,
PM;t(j) is the price of the imported good expressed in domestic currency and PM;t
is the ideal import price index, given by PM;t =
hR 1
0
PM;t (j)
1 IMP dj
i 1
1 IMP . The
quadratic cost function to adjusting prices is  PMt =
IMP
2

PM;t(j)=PM;t 1(j)

IMP
t 1 
1 IMP   1
2
IMPt,
where IMP > 0 and IMP 2 [0; 1] :
The nal non-tradable good is competitive. The representative rm produces
the nal good Et (which can be used for private and public consumption and for
private and public investment) by combining a bundle of domestically produced
intermediate goods YH;t with a bundle of imported intermediate goods IMPt ac-
cording to a CES technology:
YC;t =

(1  IMP )
1
IMP Y
IMP 1
IMP
H;t + IMP
1
IMP IMP
IMP 1
IMP
t
 IMP
IMP 1
; (11)
where IMP is the elasticity of substitution between domestically produced goods
and internationally produced goods, IMP represents the share of foreign intermedi-
ate goods used in the production of the nal goods and YH;t =
R 1
0
YH;t (j)
Y  1
Y dj
 Y
Y  1
,
IMPt =
R 1
0
IMPt (j)
IMP 1
IMP dj
 IMP
IMP 1
, where Y , IMP > 1 denote the elastic-
ities of substitution between the di¤erentiated intermediate goods produced at
home and abroad. Perfect competition and free entry imply zero prot, Pt =hR 1
0
Pt (j)
1 Y dj
i 1
1 Y (which denes the economy aggregate price index), and PM;t =hR 1
0
PM;t (j)
1 IMP dj
i 1
1 IMP .
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4.3 Closing the model
The model is closed considering public and foreign sectors and market-clearing con-
ditions. With regard to the public sector and foreign sector, the government issues
nominal debt in the form of interest-bearing bonds. Public consumption and invest-
ment, interest payments on outstanding public debt, transfers to households, and
subsidies to rms are nanced by taxes on capital, labor and consumption, and/or
by issuance of new bonds. To ensure that the scal budget constraint is respected,
it is assumed that the tax authority adopts a tax rule that responds to public debt
variations. The external monetary authority (ECB) controls the nominal interest
rate, which responds to some extent to domestic conditions. The development of
the net foreign asset position depends on the current account surplus, and therefore
on the decisions of rms, households and government. The transmission mechanism
from internal to external variables is further complicated by the assumption that
the domestic exporting and importing rms have some market power in the prices
they set, so that the net external position depends on conditions in both nancial
and goods markets.
The public sector is characterized by two equations dening the public decit
dynamics and the tax rule. Specically, the government purchases nal goods for
consumption CGt and investment I
G
t , makes transfers to households Trt, gives sub-
sidies to intermediate goods producers SUBt, receives lump-sum taxes Tt and tax
payments on labor income, consumption and capital TLt , T
C
t ; T
K
t , and issues nom-
inal bonds Bt (in real terms Brt ). The real decit (Dt) dynamics is then given
by:
Dt = (Rt 1   1)B
r
t 1
t
+
PC;t
Pt
Gt +
PIG;t
Pt
IGt + Trt   Tt  
X
t2
t + SUBt; (12)
where t 2 fTLt ; TCt ; TKt g are determined by the given tax rates on labor, consump-
tion and capital. The tax dynamics are described by a scal rule, which captures
the tax response to the public nance indicators (debt and decit) and the stance
of stabilization policies. Formally, the scal rule in deviations from the steady state
is:
~Tt = TB
~Brt 1
t
+ TD ~Dt + TY ~Yt (13)
where TB, TD, TY are policy parameters.
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The monetary authority adopts a Taylor-type interest rate rule, which is speci-
ed as follows:
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
r t

 Yt
Y
y St
S
s1 r
eu
R
t (14)
where R is the equilibrium nominal interest rate,  is the monetary authority
ination target, S is the long-run (steady state) exchange rate, Y is the steady
state output, and R; ; Y , S are policy parameters.
The economys net foreign asset position denominated in domestic currency
evolves as:
StBF;t =
 
Rt 1 + 
F
t 1

StBF;t 1 + StPX;tEXPt   PM;tIMPt; (15)
where the risk premium Ft is assumed to be increasing in the aggregate level of
foreign debt. The following functional form for the risk premium is used: Ft =
 'F (eBr;Ft  Br;F   1); where 'F is a positive parameter, Br;Ft = StBF;t=Pt and Br;F
is the steady state level of net foreign assets in real terms (see Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe, 2003). Clearly, in the steady-state Ft = 0.
Since only Ricardian households hold nancial assets, accumulate physical cap-
ital and own domestic rms, equilibrium satised in aggregate: (1   sN)BRt = Bt,
(1   sN)BRF;t = BF;t, (1   sN)IRt = It, (1   sN)KRt = Kt, (1   sN)PRORt = PROt
while aggregate consumption is Ct = (1  sN)CRt + sNCNt .
Equilibrium in the labor markets requires that the quantity of each category of
labor employed in the intermediate good sector must be equal to supply. Labor mar-
ket clearing conditions are then Ni;t = (1  sN)LRi;t+ sNLNi;t for i 2 `. Since the nal
good can be used for private and public consumption and for private and public in-
vestment, we have PC;t = PI;t =

(1  IMP )P 1 IMPt + IMPP 1 IMPM;t
 1
1 IMP , and
PM;tIMPt+PtYH;t = PC;t
 
Ct + C
G
t + It + I
G
t

. Market clearing in the intermediate
goods market requires Yt = YH;t + St
PX;t
Pt
EXPt.
The resource constraint of the economy immediately follows:
Yt =
PCt
 
Ct + C
G
t + It + I
G
t

Pt
+
StPX;tEXPt   PM;tIMPt
Pt
+  t (16)
where  t is the sum of all the  -adjustment costs.
28
  
 Appendix B - Estimated model
This appendix reports the equations of the stochastic estimated version of IGEM.
Consumption of the Ricardian Households:
Pt
PC;t
1
(1 + Ct )
 
CRt   hRCRt 1
 = Et Pt+1
PC;t+1
1
(1 + Ct+1)
 
CRt+1   hRCRt
 Rt
t+1
Zt
Lagrangian Multiplier of the Ricardian and Non-Ricardian Households:
it =
Pt
PC;t
Zt
(1 + Ct )
 
Cit   hiCit 1
 ; i 2 fR;Ng
Consumption of the Non-Ricardian Households:
CNt =
Pt
(1 + Ct )PC;t
"
sA
 
1  At

WRAt LA;t
sN
+
LsL
sN
  
1   it

WRitLL;t  
WL (

i
t   1)2 Yt
2
!
  TNt + TrNt
#
with 
it =
tWRit=WR
i
t 1

W
t 1
1 W for i 2 fS;H;Lg.
Aggregate Consumption:
Ct = sNC
N
t + (1  sN)CRt
Wage Equation of Self-Employed Labor Workers:
 
1  St

WRSt =
!SS (1  LS;t) vS
Rt (S   1)
  
W
S 

S
t
 

St   1

Yt
(S   1)LS;t +
+
Rt+1
Rt
WS 

S
t+1
 

St+1   1

Yt+1
(S   1)LS;t
Wage Equation of Skilled Employees:
 
1  Ht

WRHt = exp(
WH
t )
!HH (1  LH;t) vH
Rt (H   1)
  
W
H 

H
t
 

Ht   1

Yt
(H   1)LH;t +
+
Rt+1
Rt
WH 

H
t+1
 

Ht+1   1

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t
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Wage Equation of Unskilled Employees:
 
1  Lt

WRLt = exp(
WL
t )
!LL (1  LL;t) vL
t (L   1)  
t
W
L 

L
t
 

Lt   1

Yt
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+
t+1
t
WL 

L
t+1
 

Lt+1   1

Yt+1
(L   1)LL;t 
WL
t
where t =

(1  INRL)Rt + INRLNt

.
Supply of Atypical Labor Services:
WRAt
 
1  At

=
!A (1 NA;t) vA
Nt
Demand of Skilled Labor as Employees:
WRHt
 
1  subHt + Hf;t

= L (1  G)MCt Yt
NHLt
e
HL 1
HL
H

NHLt
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 1
HL
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 LH

NH;t
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  1

1
NH;t 1
Yt +
+
Rt+1
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
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  1

NH;t+1
N2H;t
Yt+1
Demand of Unskilled Labor as Employees:
WRLt
 
1  subLt + Lf;t

= L (1  G)MCt Yt
NHLt
e
HL 1
HL
L

NHLt
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HL
+
 LL
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Yt
NL;t 1
+
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  1
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Demand of Self-Employed Labor:
WRSt
 
1  subSt + Sf;t

= N (1  G)MCt Yt
NSAt
e
N 1
N
S

NSAt
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Demand of Atypical Labor:
WRAt
 
1 + Af;t

= N (1  G)MCt Yt
NSAt
e
N 1
N
A

NSAt
NA;t
 1
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Equilibrium in the Labor Market:
Ni;t = (1  sN)LRi;t + sNLNi;t for i 2 `
Production Function of the Intermediate-Goods Producers:
Yt = At
h
e
L
t NHLt
L 
e
L
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N
i1 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35
HL
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Self-Employed and Atypical Labor CES Aggregate:
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24 X
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SA
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Physical Capital Accumulation Equation:
Kt+1 = (1  K)Kt + It
Investment Equation
qt   1 = IIt

It
Kt
  K

  tcrKt
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Tobins Q:
qt = Et
Rt+1
Rt t+1
24KSRt+1ut + (1  K) qt+1   X
i2fI;ug
 it +
It+1
1  sN
@ It
@IRt+1
35 premt
Demand of Capital:
rkt =
Pt
P It
(1  G) (1  L   N)MCtYt
utKt
Capital Utilization:
uKt = 1 
u1   (1  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u2
Real Prots of Intermediate Goods Producers:
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Ination Equation:
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Accumulation of Public Capital:
GKt+1 = I
G
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Public Debt Dynamics:
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Transfers:
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N
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Labor Taxes and Social Contributions:
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
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Consumption Taxes:
TV ATt = 
C
t
PC;t
Pt
Ct
Capital Taxes Net of Tax Credit:
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P It
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 
rKt   K

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Fiscal Rule:
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Lump-Sum Taxes Levied on Ricardian Households:
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Tax Pro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Resource Constraint of the Economy:
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Interest Rate Rule:
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Import Price Ination:
(1  IMP )PM;t + IMPStP t
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Export Price Ination:
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Domestic Consumption Price Index:
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Euler Equation Related to Foreign Assets:
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Market Clearing Condition:
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Imported Good Price Level:
PM;t = 
IMP
t PM;t 1
Domestic Final Good Ination:
t = Pt=Pt 1
Export Price Ination:
EXPt = PX;t=PX;t 1
Price Indexation:
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Wage Indexation:
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Wage Mark-up Shock (Unskilled):
WLt = 
L
w
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t 1 + "
wll
t
Preference Shock:
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Z
t
Investment Specic Shock:
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t
36
  
 Appendix C IGEM calibrations
The model calibration follows Annicchiarico et al. (2013a) to whom we refer for
more details.
The discount factor  is equal to 0:99, implying an annual real interest rate of
4%. The rates of depreciation of private and public physical capital K and G are
set to 0:025 implying a 10% annual depreciation rate of capital. The capital share
in the intermediate goods production is equal to 0:3, hence 1 L N = 0:3. The
labor shares are such that L = N = 0:35: The CES parameters L and N are
set at 1:4 according to Katz and Murphy (1992) estimates, as in QUEST III for
Italy. As in the baseline IGEM, the contribution of public capital to production is
neglected (i.e., G = 0).
The elasticities of substitution between domestic goods in the intermediate sec-
tor, Y ; is set equal to 5 so to have a steady-state level of net markup equal to 25%,
which is consistent with the value set in the Italian version of QUEST III with
R&D (see DAuria et al., 2009). Since in IGEM tradable goods are produced in the
intermediate sector, we also set the elasticities of substitution between imported
and exported varieties, IMP and EXP , at 5. The contribution of imported inter-
mediate goods to the nal good production, summarized by the parameter IMP
is equal to 0:26, while the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
intermediate varieties IMP is set at 1:1. Similarly, EXP = 0:26 and IMP = 1:1.
The steady-state ination is set equal to zero,  = 1. The same holds for foreign
ination.
Drawing on RCFL-ISTAT 2008 data set, labor categories are dened as follows.
Employees are identied with those workers with a stable labor contract and eligible
of labor protection, so belonging to the primary labor market. In the available data,
this category amounts to 53% of the whole workforce, within this category the
share of the employees with tertiary education corresponds to the skilled workers
and accounts for 11% of the workers (i.e., sH = 0:11). The remaining share is
identied with the unskilled employees (i.e., sL = 0:42). The share of self-employed
workers older than 35, is 21% and the model share sS is set accordingly. As a
matter of fact, we exclude from this category of workers the young, since at early
stages of their careers they tend to be precarious and face the same di¢ culties of
the workers with atypical contracts. Hence, the last category of workers, labeled as
atypical, includes young self-employed, apprentices, temporary workers and other
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workers with atypical contracts characterized by weak security protection and low
ring costs, so belonging to the secondary market. This residual fraction of workers
amounts to 26% (i.e., sA = 0:26). The share of liquidity constrained households is
26%.
According to the estimates based on EconLav microsimulation model, the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply for the employees is 0:30, while for the atypical component
of the labor force the Frisch elasticity is equal to 0:35. For the self-employed workers
we set the Frisch elasticity at 0:30, since it is conjectured that the reactivity of
their labor supply to changes in their remuneration is closer to that experienced by
workers with stable contracts. In line with the literature, elasticities of substitution
between di¤erent varieties of labor L, H , and S are all set at 2:65 (see Forni et al.,
2010), reecting the limited competition protecting the insiders. Habit of Ricardian
households and habit of Non-Ricardian households are 0:7 and 0:3, respectively.
The calibration of the tax system points to heavy taxation on capital and labor
income, where di¤erent rates are considered for each labor category. The tax rate
on consumption C is equal to 0:17, while the tax rate on physical capital K is 0:33,
consistently with the calibration used in the Italian version of QUEST III (DAuria
et al., 2009). For the tax rates on wage income, the calibration is based on data
taken from RFCL-ISTAT 2008. In particular, the average legal tax rate on labor
income paid by skilled employees is equal to 0:27, that for the unskilled is set at
0:24, for the self-employed is 0:26, and for the atypical workers is 0:24. The social
contribution rates paid by rms and workers are set, respectively, at 0:33 and 0:09
as legal rates of contribution.
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 Appendix D Diagnostic tests
Figure D1 traces the graph of historical and smoothed variables. The black dotted
line represents the observed data, while the red line represents the estimate of the
smooth variable derived from the Kalman smoother at the posterior mean. In the
case of no measurement error, both series are identical.
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Figure D1 - Historical and smoothed variables
Figure D2 plots the smoothed shocks. The black line represents the estimate of
the smoothed structural shocks derived from the Kalman smoother at the posterior
mean.
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Figure D2 - Smoothed shocks
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